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Many studies have examined the effects of land use policies on land prices and urban spatial 
form.  These studies have largely focused on the effects of various land use regulations, 
including zoning, growth controls, development fees, and differential tax assessment.  
Theoretical papers have considered their impacts on land prices, development timing, and 
patterns of land development, and empirical analyses have tended to focus on the effects of these 
regulatory measures on land prices.  While the sizes of the impacts vary, these studies generally 
find that increased regulation tends to increase house prices and delay development.  
 
Increasingly, jurisdictions have adopted incentive based mechanisms to manage the pace 
and pattern of urban growth and the conversion of agricultural land.  Under one such mechanism, 
landowners voluntarily receive payment for agreeing to forego conversion and accept easements 
placed on their land.  Since the first ‘purchase of development rights’ (PDR) program was 
implemented in 1974, over 53 state and local governments have collectively spent almost $2.4 
billion in public funds to preserve nearly 1.5 million acres in the U.S. (American Farmland 
Trust).  In 2002 the Federal government authorized $986 million in matching funds for farmland 
preservation over the 2002-2006 period.  PDR programs enjoy continued taxpayer support; in 
2003 alone, $700 million in state and local ballot measures were passed to provide funding for 
farm and ranch land protection (Trust for Public Land).   
 
In urbanizing areas where landowners can choose to reap immediate financial rewards 
through development, PDR’s offer an alternative that allows them to continue farming while 
receiving remuneration for their development rights.  Empirical studies have characterized 
decisions to participate in PDR programs (e.g., Nickerson; Duke and others), or evaluated 
efficiency and distributional aspects of these programs (Nickerson and Barnard; Lynch and 
Musser), but remarkably few studies have explored the effects of the existence of PDR programs 
on land development decisions themselves.  Given the significant costs involved in preserving 
farmland – which averages approximately $2,000 per acre nationally (American Farmland Trust) 
  2– government agencies are increasingly interested in the effectiveness of PDR programs. Two 
studies have considered the effects of PDR programs on rates of urban development using 
aggregate (county level and crop reporting district) data, and find limited evidence that they slow 
conversions (Miller and Nickerson; Lynch and Carpenter).  A few micro-level studies suggest 
that PDR programs may actually hasten the development of adjacent parcels by making this land 
more valuable in residential use (e.g., Irwin; Irwin and Bockstael).  To our knowledge no studies 
have explored how the very existence of an option to participate in a PDR program affects 
landowners’ development decisions.  That is, even if a landowner ultimately chooses not to 
preserve, the existence of an option to do so may alter the time at which conversion occurs.  
Results from real options theory suggest that this may be the case – and, in particular, that the 
existence of the PDR option may delay conversion decisions.  If so, these programs may 
generate benefits (by retaining land in farming longer) beyond those provided by the farmland 
enrolled in the programs.
2 
 
Using micro-level data on conversions and preservation of farmland, we empirically test 
some fundamental results of real options theory in the presence of multiple options.  Land 
conversion decisions lend themselves to real options theory analysis because conversion 
decisions are irreversible, returns are uncertain, and the decision to convert can be postponed 
(Titman; Tegene, Wiebe and Kuhn (1999)).  Real options theory suggests that the net present 
value model for investment decisions, which most studies on land use conversion utilize, is 
incorrect. Uncertainty in returns creates a wedge between the discounted present value of returns 
and the cost of investment.  The size of this wedge is typically increasing in the variance of 
returns, encouraging postponement of a conversion decision in order to acquire more 
information. Extensions to the basic theory suggest that faced with multiple options of similar 
value, a firm or landowner will delay investment decisions (Capozza and Li; Geltner and 
Riddiough; Trigeorgis). 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
1 This work was partially funded by a cooperative agreement with the Economic Research Service of the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture and by grants from the STAR program of the Environmental Protection Agency. 
2 Both farmland preservation and these additional ‘farmland’ benefits do come at a cost, however: the foregone 
benefits associated with development.  Whether the one outweighs the other is not at issue in this paper. 
  3Despite theoretical progress on real options, empirical evidence of these effects in the 
land use context is scant.  Quigg (1993) finds that sales prices of land in the Seattle area reflect a 
premium for the option to delay a development decision. Schatzki (2003) finds evidence that 
sunk costs and uncertainty in returns lowers the likelihood of land conversion from agriculture to 
forest in Georgia.  Our paper considers how an additional land use alternative, preservation, 




Three characteristics of investment options explain the observed failure of the net present value 
rule to characterize investment decisions.  First, the option once exercised is irreversible; NPV 
models implicitly assume that an investment can be reversed if the market is less favorable in 
subsequent periods, or they assume irreversibility but that the current period is the only period in 
which the investment can be undertaken.  Second, the decision can be delayed.  Third, the 
investment return is uncertain. 
   
The basic real options story is described in Dixit and Pindyck (1994, Ch. 5) and is based 
on earlier work by McDonald and Siegel (1986).  They consider the problem of when to invest in 
a project with a sunk cost of I and expected return of V, where V evolves according to a 
geometric Brownian motion: 
 
(1)  dV Vdt Vdz α σ =+. 
 
In (1), α is the ‘drift’ (i.e. the rate of growth) in expected returns, σ is the standard error of the 
investment value, and dz is an increment of a Weiner process or the continuous time equivalent 
of a random walk.  Equation (1) implies that the current value of the project is known, but future 
values are uncertain, are lognormally distributed, and have a variance that grows linearly with 
the time horizon.
3   
 
                                                 
3 In our model of land conversion, the drift and variance parameters are time varying.  This does not change the 
interpretation. 
  4In our context V is a function of parcel and regional characteristics that are likely to 
influence development returns.  The value of the option to convert land in the future is defined 
by the function F(V), where  
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where T is the time of conversion, I is the cost of conversion including opportunity costs of 
foregoing future agricultural returns, and ρ is the discount rate.
4  The option will be exercised 
when the return to investment exceeds the expected capital appreciation.   
 
The solution to the problem must satisfy several conditions, including continuity 
restrictions and an ‘absorbing boundary’ condition - if the option value goes to zero it stays zero.  
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) set of the conditions for solution which defines the optimal return at 
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where the term pre-multiplying I represents the wedge between the real options investment rule 
and the neoclassical investment rule.  In terms of the drift and variance concepts from (1), β1 is 
defined by: 
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This equation yields the comparative static results that are the basis for inclusion of the 
variance and drift variables in our empirical application.  First, an increase in the variance of 
development returns leads to a decrease in  1 β .  Since ∂  this 
increases the wedge between returns and costs, thereby delaying the decision to develop.  
Second, as the drift increases, 
, 0 ) 1 /( / *
2
1 1 < − − = ∂ β β I V
1 β  increases, moving forward the decision to develop.       
                                                 
4 It is necessary for ρ > α.   That is, the impatience embodied in the discount rate must exceed the mean increase in 
return. Otherwise, a landowner would always find it optimal to wait to invest.   
  5 
Our empirical model investigates a more complex real options problem – one in which 
land use conversion occurs in the presence of more than one ‘investment’ option.  Specifically, 
landowners can ‘invest’ by developing or by selling their rights to develop.  Capozza and Li’s 
theoretical model predicts that options to develop at different intensities can delay development.  
In this paper we test whether a different land use option delays development decisions.   
 
Geltner and Riddiough’s theoretical work that predicts the decision will be indefinitely 
delayed when the options are of similar values and the returns are highly correlated.  This 
suggests that landowners might indefinitely delay a development decision if  easement values 
and development returns are both dependent on a single stochastic process – e.g. land prices.   In 
our study area, the easement payment is not necessarily highly correlated with movements in 
land prices; payment is determined as a static function of parcel characteristics.  And, it is the 
easement payment that is likely to determine whether preservation constitutes a viable option, 
since a landowner will only preserve if this payment exceeds his reservation price for selling an 
easement.  Thus, the presence of a PDR program in our study area may be expected to delay 
development decisions on qualifying parcels because of the existence of  multiple ‘investment’ 
options, but the decision will not be delayed indefinitely.
5  
 
Hazard model of the timing of land conversion   
 
Many land use studies evaluate conversion decisions utilizing discrete choice models as a 
function of parcel level attributes (Bockstael; McMillen; Kline and Alig; Landis and Zhang).  
This approach provides insights on how parcel attributes affect the probability of conversion but 
does not account for the dynamic environment in which conversion decisions are made.  
Duration models, on the other hand, are particularly useful for studying factors affecting the 
occurrence and timing of decisions and are increasingly applied in a land use context (Irwin; 
Irwin and Bockstael; Nickerson and Bockstael; Hite).  We employ duration models because we 
                                                 
5 A second strand of literature on multiple options deals with how option pricing depends on the nature of the 
investment, e.g., sequential or conditional investments (Trigeorgis 1998).  This strand of literature is less relevant for 
our current study as we are not trying to price the easement option (for articles on valuing options see, for example, 
Tegene, Wiebe and Kuhn; Quigg; Plantinga, Stavins, and Lubowski). 
 
  6are primarily interested in testing predictions of real options theory that affect the timing of 
landowner decisions to develop.     
 
Duration models are explicitly concerned with the timing of transition from one state to 
the next, where one mechanism governs both the occurrence and timing of the transition.  These 
models contain two key features useful in our modeling effort:  they incorporate the conditional 
probability that the conversion occurs in period t, given that it has not occurred up until period t, 
and they allow incorporation of variables that vary over time – which capture the cumulative 
effects of changes on the conversion probability.   
 
The distribution of the durations in the undeveloped state can be described in terms of the 
hazard function or the survival function.  First, define T as the duration of time the parcel is in 
the undeveloped state, where F(t) is the cumulative distribution of the random variable T. The 
survival function, S(t), is the probability that the parcels survives in the undeveloped state at least 
to period t, and therefore is equal to 1-F(t)= Pr(T>t). The hazard function, h(t), is the probability 
that the failure event occurs in the time period between t and  t ∆ , conditional on the fact that 
, i.e., the event had not yet occurred.  This function, the hazard rate, is interpreted as the 
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t h =  where f(t) is the density function associated with F(t).  
 
Hazard models can be estimated with fully parametric hazard functions as well as semi-
parametric (Cox) hazard functions.  The principal advantage of the former is that it allows us to 
estimate the mean duration for ‘censored’ parcels, i.e. parcels that remain undeveloped at the end 
of the study period.  This allows us to determine whether the average time until conversion 
  7differs between parcels that face multiple options (development and preservation) and those that 
face only the development option.  A second advantage is that fully parametric hazard functions 
explicitly deal with censored observations in the likelihood function, unlike the Cox model 
which estimates a partial likelihood based on the order of conversion events (Cox).  Also, Cox 
models do not handle ties in the data well.  Ties are events that occur in the same time period as 
defined by the periodicity of the data (e.g. conversions that occur within the same year, where 
the calendar year is the temporal unit of observation).  The nature of our data allows us to 
observe only 11 event times (one per year) and 383 events (conversions) leading to many ties.  
On the other hand, the main advantage of the Cox model is that it does not require specification 
of a distribution of the baseline hazard while still providing estimates of the effects of covariates 
on the hazard rate.  It is also considered to be somewhat more robust than parametric models 
(Allison).  We estimate three fully parametric models, as well as a Cox model as a sensitivity 
check. 
 
The general form for estimating a proportional parametric hazard model is:  
 
(6a)  01 1 ( ) ( )exp( ... ) ii ht ht x x k i k β β =+ + , 
 
where the subscript i denotes an individual parcel and is the baseline hazard that affects all 
parcels equally.  In essence,   picks up the development pressure that is being exerted on the 
study area as a whole which varies over time but not over space.   xi1…k  are variables affecting 
the hazard of conversion and β1…k are corresponding coefficients to be estimated.  Included in 
xi1…k are factors affecting net returns to development, such as proximity to employment centers 
and nearby population densities, parcel attributes affecting conversion costs, measures of 
development regulations, and land quality characteristics affecting returns to agricultural uses.  
Also included are the ‘real options’ variables expected to affect the timing of conversion 
decisions:  the variance and drift of expected development returns, as well as a binary variable 




The parametric assumption for the baseline hazard enters the model through h0(t).  
Taking the log of both sides of equation 6a we have   
  8 
(6b)  11 log ( ) ( ) ... ik ht t x x i k ω ββ =++ +, 
where for purposes of subsequent notation, we will define the following: 
 
(6c)       ). exp( β θ i x =  
 
We consider two primary specifications for the baseline hazard which lead to the Weibull and 
the Gompertz.  Both specifications allow the baseline hazard to be a monotonically increasing or 
decreasing.  The Weibull hazard function is given by   and the Gompertz by  
1 ) (
− =
α θαt t h
()
t ht e
γ θ = .  Both of these models are proportional hazard representations because the ratio of 
hazard functions for two observations is independent of the baseline hazard.
6  
 
To compare robustness of the coefficient estimates we also estimate a flexible baseline 
hazard using the piecewise exponential.  The hazard function for this distribution is 
  
(7)     where δm = 1 for (am-1≤ t < am) and = 0 otherwise.  m
M
m





In (7), the am’s represent a series of breakpoints and the hm’s represent the baseline hazard rates 
in each of the m intervals.  We set our breakpoints such that tm is a yearly dummy, following the 
periodicity of our data.  This specification allows the baseline hazard to change each year.  The 
key weakness of this specification is the lack of predictive power beyond the last interval in the 
data.  Because we allow h to vary over in a non-systematic way over time, we have no way of 
predicting   for future years.
7  m h
  
Parametric specifications are estimated using full information maximum likelihood.  For 
an observation known to experience an event during the study period, the contribution to the 
                                                 
6 If ω =1 the Weibull hazard model reduces to the exponential model, a form in which the baseline hazard is 
constant over time.  The nesting of the exponential within the Weibull this allows a likelihood ratio test for model 
selection between the two.   
7 Extrapolating the h from the final study year into the future turns out to lead to exaggerated estimates for mean 
duration times of undeveloped parcels in our study. 
  9likelihood function is the value of the density function at time t conditional on the entry time t ,  0
0 (, | ) f tt θ .  For a censored observation known to survive to time t, the contribution to the 
likelihood function is the value of the survival function,St 0 (, | ) t θ , the probability of surviving 
beyond time t conditional on entry time.  Assuming N observations (j = 1,…,N), with U 
observations that experience an event during the study period (U ≤ N), the log likelihood 
function is written as, 
(8)     ,  00
11








where the specific forms of f(.) and S(.) are determined by the choice of probability distribution 
for the hazard. 
 
The parameters of the Cox model are estimated by maximizing the log of the partial 
likelihood function which does not contain the baseline hazard.  Unlike most applications of 
maximum likelihood, each observation in the data set does not necessarily make a contribution to 
the likelihood function in the Cox model; the ones that do are those that are observed to 
experience an event during the study period.  Information about the censored observations, 
however, appears in the denominator of each likelihood contribution.  The likelihood function is 
the product of all U contributions.  Assuming that exactly one conversion occurs at each event 
time, the likelihood function is given by: 
 
(9)  ()
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where M(ti) is the set of parcels still “at risk” of conversion at time ti.   
 
  Two issues that arise in using duration models are censoring and exogeneity of time 
varying variables.  Censoring occurs when the study period ends before the last observation 
‘fails’.  In our case we have many right-censored parcels - those that do not develop during the 
study period.  We assume that, conditional on the covariates, the true duration is independent of 
  10the starting point (beginning of the observation period), and the censoring time (end of the 
observation period).  This assumption holds when the starting point and censoring time are the 
same for all individuals, which is the case in our data (Wooldridge (pg. 696)).  Time varying 
variables will be exogenous when they are defined both within and outside the duration T.  If 
defined only within the ‘spell’, they are endogenous (Kalbfleisch and Prentice).
8  Our time 
varying variables satisfy this exogeneity test.   
 
 
Study Area and Description of Data   
 
Howard County, Maryland serves as the study area.  Located between Baltimore and 
Washington, D.C., residents commute to both metropolitan areas.  This county is under heavy 
development pressure –in part because of its proximity to two major employment centers, but 
also because several neighboring counties ‘downzoned’ in their designated agricultural areas 
during the late 1970s (to a realized density of no more than 1 house per 15-25 acres).  While 
Howard County’s government is concerned with preservation of the county’s agricultural 
heritage, it has not similarly ‘downzoned’.  All county land outside the public water and sewer 
service boundaries is in either the rural conservation zone or the rural residential zone, where 
development is allowed at a realized density of one house per 4.25 acres.  Parcels less than 20 
acres can be developed on three acre lots.  Other than through zoning and offering a preservation 
option, the county has relied primarily on adequate public facilities ordinances (relating to 
schools, road capacity, sewer capacity, etc.) to manage the pace and pattern of development.
9 
 
Unlike the state program in Maryland, Howard County does not require prior enrollment 
in an agricultural district in order to be eligible to sell an easement.  The usual five-year district 
enrollment period is considered too significant a transaction cost in Howard County’s climate of 
fast-rising land values.  To qualify for the county PDR program, a parcel must be at least 100 
acres; parcels at least 25 acres qualify if adjacent to at least 50 acres of preserved farmland.  In 
                                                 
8 An example of an endogenous variable arises in the context of a job tenure study using wage on the job as a time 
varying covariate.  When the tenure is complete the wage on that job is no longer relevant.   
9 The adequate public facility ordinance allows the county to postpone, temporarily, new subdivision construction in 
any planning zone with insufficient school (and, more recently, road) capacity until new infrastructure can be built. 
  11addition, only parcels not served by public sewer and water are eligible.  This translates into a 
requirement that the parcel be in the western part of the county.    
 
The price a landowner can expect to receive for an easement in the county PDR program 
is based on a published formula.  The County pays a higher price for parcels with better soils, 
more road frontage, more surrounding agriculture, less erosion or drainage problems, and more 
actively farmed land in the production of food or fiber.  The county subjectively ranks the 
applications based on which parcels contribute more to the farming industry (for example, farms 
with fertilizer processing equipment or a feed distribution facilities are ranked higher), are most 
viable and under moderate development pressure.  Parcels whose owners have offered to sell 
their easements are ranked on the basis of the above considerations and the county extends offers 
until funds are exhausted.  Since the Howard County PDR program has been in operation, it has 
faced severe budget constraints in several years, including inability to fund any purchases in 
some years.  Nonetheless, a considerable amount of land has been preserved within the program.  
When Howard County instituted their PDR program in 1980, about 34 percent of its 161,408 
acres were in farmland.  Between then and the end of our study period in 2001, about 16,000 
acres were preserved through the PDR program and about 20,000 acres were converted to 
residential uses. 
10   
 
   The data for this study consist of parcel level data for all undeveloped parcels in Howard 
County, Maryland as of 1990.  Pooling several data sources – primarily property tax assessment 
data and GIS data from the county and state, including actual parcel boundaries – we were able 
to reconstruct the landscape as of the end of 1990 and identify at what point in time during the 
1991 through 2001 study period parcels were converted to house lots.
11  In the final dataset we 
have included all undeveloped parcels as of the end of 1990 that were eligible to be subdivided 
                                                 
10 Howard County landowners also had the option of preserving in the State of Maryland’s PDR program.  However, 
the county PDR program had fewer enrollment requirements and paid a higher price per acre for the easements.  The 
differences in transaction costs combined with the lower payments were so pronounced that landowners chose not to 
enroll in the State program, before and after the county program was active.  Thus, only one viable preservation 
option existed.  
11 These data sources include the Maryland Taxation and Assessment Data for transaction data and most data on 
parcel characteristics; GIS parcel boundaries, zoning information and sewer service boundaries were provided by 
Howard County; and census data for tract and region specific variables.  GIS data on roads was available from the 
State Highway Administration and GIS data on natural landscape features from the Maryland Department of Natural 
Resources. 
  12into 3 or more housing lots.
12  Not all land that was potentially developable at the beginning of 
the study period had the option to preserve.  Only parcels of at least 100 acres were eligible to 
enroll, unless the parcel was at least 25 acres and adjacent to at least 50 acres of preserved 
farmland.  Parcels had to meet minimum soil quality criteria and also could not be located within 
public sewer boundaries.  The final data set included 1,688 parcels totaling 46,000 acres, of 
which 255 parcels were eligible for preservation at some time during the study period.  These 
data represent a unique and rich view of the land conversion process across space and time in a 
rapidly developing county.  
 
Important variables affecting the hazard of development include net returns to developed 
uses. We follow most empirical studies by measuring distance to urban centers to capture the 
effect of proximity to major employment centers – in our case, Baltimore, MD (distba) and 
Washington, D.C. (distdc).  Using Census tract data we calculated the number of lots developed 
in the previous year divided by total number of developable lots at the beginning of the year in 
each tract (devRate) as a proxy for development pressure in the neighborhood of the parcel.  
Recent empirical evidence indicates that surrounding land uses affect the value of land in 
developed uses (e.g., Irwin; Irwin and Bockstael; Geoghegan, et al.).  Here, we include several 
variables calculated in units of the percentage of surrounding land use.  The surrounding land 
uses are:  
o  Commercial, Exempt, and public buildings (s_comm) 
o  Open space (parks, preserved, protected) (s_open) 
o  Undeveloped farm and forestland (s_undev) 
o  Land that has begun the development process (s_subdiv) 
o  Residential land (low, medium, and high density) (s_residential). 
 
The surrounding land use measures are calculated from Maryland Department of Planning land 
use/cover maps and report percent of land within 800 meters of the true parcel boundary.  We 
chose 800 meters because measures calculated using a radii of less than this have not yielded 
                                                 
12 We defined conversion in this way to avoid counting the development of family lots as a conversion of farmland 
to residential use. 
  13robust results using data in this study area (e.g., Irwin).  These measures are updated annually as 
neighboring parcels are converted (to commercial or residential uses) or preserved.  
 
To proxy for construction costs we include the percentage of the parcel that is classified 
as a steep grade (steep), the percentage of the parcel that is not suitable for road construction 
(notRoadSuit), the percentage of the parcel that is not suitable for septic (notSepticSuit), a 
dummy equal to one if sewer service does not exist but is planned in the near future for that 
parcel (sewerPlnd), and the construction cost index for the Baltimore region (cci).  Regulatory 
variables include number of lots that the parcel can be divided into given zoning regulations 
(numlots), a dummy variable equal to one if the parcel is in an area unconstrained by an adequate 
public facilities moratorium (noApfo), and a dummy variable equal to one if an open space set 
aside is required (reqOpenSpace).  Assuming the exogeneity of these variables is reasonable, 
based on the facts that the Howard County Comprehensive Plan and zoning codes were passed in 
1990 and remained intact through our study period.   
 
To capture the effect of returns in an agricultural use on the hazard of development, we 
include soil measures that reflect the quality of the soil for agricultural purposes.  class1 is the 
percentage of the parcel in class 1 soils and includes soils that are prime for row cropping.  The 
remaining soil variables (class2, class3, and class4) are also measured in percentage terms, and 
are associated with declining soil quality for agricultural uses. The effect of these variables is 
measured relative to the worst soils for agriculture (the excluded soil category).  Other measures 
relating to the agricultural use include parcel size (acres and acres squared) and a dummy 
variable equal to one if the land is being actively farmed, based on whether the parcel receives an 
agricultural tax assessment (farmed).  Although the soil classifications could proxy for 
agricultural returns, good agricultural soils can also be favorable soils for development, so the 
expected direction of the effect on the hazard rate is ambiguous.  The effect of the size of the 
parcel on the hazard rate is also ambiguous, as economies of scale may be evident in both 
farming and development.  For a list of variables and descriptive statistics see Table 1.   
 
We also needed to construct drift and variance variables to test our real options theory.  
As the role of these variables is to capture dimensions of uncertainty in returns to investment (i.e. 
  14returns to development of land for residential use), we used a separate dataset on sales of 
unimproved housing lots in Howard County from 1986 to 2001, calculating drift and variance 
variables for each area of the county (defined by Census tract) and each time period.  Sales in 
which price exceeded two standard deviations from the Census tract mean for the year were 
omitted in order to eliminate the undue influence of outlier parcels whose special characteristics 
we were unable to identify.  After eliminating non-arms length sales and clearly mistyped 
entries, 9128 observations remained.  
 
Our drift variable for any given tract and year was calculated as the average rate of 
growth in deflated lot price for sales within the tract over the previous 6 years, corrected for the 
two principle sources of lot price variation – distance to Washington DC and size of lot.   
Specifically, for any year, t, and tract, j, the following OLS regression was estimated: 
 
i i i i lotsize i lotsize i distdc lagyear deflatedSP ε γ γ γ α α + + + + + = ) ln( * ) ln( * 2 ) ln( * 1 *
2
3 0  
 
where the observations for the j,t regression included all lots sold in tract j during years t-1, t-2, 
…, t-6.  The variable deflatedSP is the inflation adjusted sales price in 2000 dollars, lagyear 
equals s if the sale took place in year t-s,  lotsize is lot size in acres, and distdc is the distance to 
the center of Washington DC in miles.    2 1 0   and , , , γ γ α α  are estimated coefficients and the 
coefficient α on lagyear becomes our measure for the drift parameter.  Separate regressions are 
estimated, and therefore distinct drift values are calculated, for each of the 15 tracts and 11 years 
(from 1991 to 2001) making 165 regressions in all.    
 
The variance was calculated using the unimproved lot sales data for the previous year 
only. This is the type of information that would be typically available to the average landowner 















and is calculated for each of the 15 tracts and 11 years in the dataset. 
  15 
Since we are not concerned with the level of variance or drift, each of these measures is 
standardized by dividing by the mean lot sales price in the respective tract.  The average drift for 
the entire sample is 2.9% and the average standard deviation is 24%.  Of course, few 
observations in a year can lead to a high variance - but this is also a signal of the limited 
information on recent sales with which current landowners can develop their expectations. 
 
Using this parcel specific, time varying dataset we model the timing of the decision to 
convert land from an undeveloped (agricultural) state to development.  The irreversible decision 
is defined as the “intent to develop”; this is the failure event in our dataset.  Landowners 
(farmers) can subdivide the land themselves or sell to developers who subdivide the land.  
During the study period, owners of 383 parcels recorded subdivisions with the county.  In 
general, the time of the conversion event is defined based on the subdivision recording date (for 
259 parcels).  These included landowners who subdivided themselves and developers who 
purchased the land and subdivided immediately.  However, because the sale of a parcel to a 
developer marks the intent to develop (and because subdividing sometimes takes time – 
especially for large subdivisions), we used the date of the prior sale of the parcel if that sale took 
place within two years prior to the subdivision recording date (for 124 parcels).
13   In our data, 
the year of most recent sale and the subdivision recording date coincide about 50% of the time.  
See Figure 1 for the distribution of previous sale dates relative to recording dates. 
 
Finally, in order to test the implications for development timing of the presence of 
multiple options, we included a binary variable equal to one for parcels that had the option to 
preserve in a PDR program (and 0 otherwise).  This PDR eligibility variable was calculated by 
applying the county’s published eligibility requirements for its PDR program.  Because 
adjacency to already preserved land allowed small parcels (25 ≤ acres < 100) to become eligible 
for preservation, we took account of the fact that the preservation option status could change 
during the study period.    
 
 
                                                 
13 We are testing the sensitivity of results to different definitions of the conversion time. 
  16Results 
 
Table 2 presents results of the full model under several alternative specifications ranging from 
the most to the least restrictive representation of the baseline hazard.  Instead of reporting the 
estimated values of the β’s from equation (6a), we report the exponential of the estimated β’s.  
Exp(βk) has an intuitive interpretation.  It is the ratio of the hazard evaluated at xk+1 over the 
hazard evaluated at xk, so it equals (the percentage change in hazard)/100 brought about by a one 
unit change in xk.  To see that this value is independent of other x’s and the level of xk note that  
 
   ] exp[ ] exp[
] ' exp[
)] 1 ( ' exp[
) (
) 1 (
k k k k k k
k k k k







β β β β
β β λ
β β λ






− −  
 
   
A coefficient estimate less than one implies that the covariate lowers the hazard of conversion 
and thus delays the conversion time, while those higher than one increase the hazard, bringing 
forward conversion.  For example, the easement coefficient is 0.61 in the Weibull model, 
suggesting that the easement option lowers the hazard rate by 39% (1-0.61).   
 
The exponential hazard is nested within the Weibull specification allowing a test of 
whether the hazard of conversion is constant over the study period.  Likelihood ratio tests for the 
exponential baseline hazard were rejected at the 1% level versus the Weibull and Gompertz.  
However, most results do not appear to be very sensitive to the formulation of the baseline 
hazard, implying that the parametric assumptions on the baseline hazard are not influencing the 
coefficient estimates for other covariates.  While a few coefficients are inconsistent in direction 
of influence across models, they become insignificant when the direction of influence changes.  
In what follows, we focus on the Weibull results but note differences across models in important 
variables. 
 
Variables representing the development pressure for each parcel generally increase the 
hazard of development, as expected.  Parcels in closer proximity to Washington, D.C. have a 
significantly higher hazard; employment opportunities in Baltimore have an insignificant impact. 
Conversion of parcels in a planned sewer expansion area is delayed, perhaps due to landowners 
  17speculating on the increased land value (i.e. decreased site development costs) when sewer 
expansion occurs.  The surrounding land use variables are all significant, take the expected sign, 
and, for the most part, are of similar magnitude across models.  Parcels surrounded by 
undeveloped land have a higher hazard, but the effect becomes insignificant in the least 
restrictive models.  That parcels surrounded by more parkland and privately preserved farmland 
have a higher hazard is consistent with other studies (e.g., Irwin) and suggests that while 
protection programs (parkland purchases, as well as PDR programs) might preserve individual 
parcels, they may induce faster development of neighboring parcels.   
 
The effects of regulatory requirements on conversion rates also generally conform to 
expectations.  Not surprisingly, in the absence of an adequate public facilities moratoria, the 
hazard of conversion increases (although this coefficient loses significance in the less restrictive 
models).  An increase in the lot capacity of the parcel (as dictated by zoning and environmental 
considerations) leads to an increase in the hazard rate, suggesting economies to scale in 
development may exist.     
 
As expected, actively farmed parcels (at least according to a definition of farming based 
on property tax assessment) have lower hazard rates.  The insignificance of the coefficients on 
the soil class variables suggests that the opportunity cost of forgoing agricultural returns (which 
would decrease the hazard) is offset by reduced construction costs (which increases the hazard).  
Larger parcels have a significantly higher hazard of development.  
 
The primary results of interest are the estimated coefficients on the options variables.  We 
find robust evidence that the addition of a preservation option significantly delays the 
development decision for qualified parcels.  This result is consistent across models.  In each case 
the coefficient on the easement variable is significant at the 95% confidence level.   
 
What is not evident from these models is the impact of the drift and variance variables.  
The coefficient on the variance in development returns is insignificant, and the coefficient on the 
drift variable reveals inconsistent directions of influence in the two models in which it has 
  18significance.  One limitation in our specification is that landowners are assumed to respond 
similarly to price uncertainty, regardless of the scale of development possible on a given parcel.   
 
To allow for variation in response to price uncertainty across parcels, we re-estimate the 
models allowing different coefficients for drift and variance according to the parcel’s capacity 
for developable lots.  Specifically, the distribution of parcels according to the number of 
developable lots is divided into deciles and different coefficients for drift and standard error are 
allowed by decile. 
14  These new results are reported in Table 3. Only the results with respect to 
the option-related variables appear in this table, as all other coefficient estimates remained quite 
stable when the model was expanded.  In particular, the effect of qualification for an easement 
does not change with this expanded model, still reducing the hazard rate by approximately 40%.   
   
The coefficients on the drift variables remain, for the most part, insignificant.  Whether 
this accurately reflects the failure of this aspect of options theory to apply in the development 
case or whether the result is due to measurement error is impossible to determine.    Table 3 does 
report some interesting results with respect to the variance of development returns, however.  
The standard errors are significant for many deciles and exhibit a clear increasing pattern with lot 
capacity.  For parcels that can accommodate few lots (those in the 1
st through 3
rd deciles, for 
example), an increase in the variance decreases the hazard and delays development.  But for 
those that can accommodate relatively many lots, an increase in the variance actually appears to 
move development up in time.  The results from the Cox model, which imposes the least 
structure on the problem, suggests that increases in the variance in returns significantly reduce 
the hazard rate through the middle percentiles (through the 60
th percentile) as well.  The results 
for small developments are consistent with real options theory, but those for large developments 
do not appear to be.  It is possible that the fear of increasing regulation of large subdivisions in 
the future may counteract the tendency for uncertainty to delay conversion.   
 
                                                 
14 Appendix 1 provides distributional summary statistics for number of lots and their associated acreage for these 
percentiles.  Note that acreage is only partially correlated with number of lots because of variations in zoning 
regulations across the county.  Minimum lot sizes vary significantly and amount of land excluded from development 
due to environmental sensitivity constrains varies according to parcel characteristics. 
  19How does the presence of an easement option affect the actual timing of the conversion 
decision?  To answer this we predicted the average time until conversion (mean duration) for the 
censored parcels in the dataset (i.e. those that had not been converted or preserved by the end of 
the study period).   The predicted mean durations are reported by acreage class, starting at 25 
acres (the minimum acreage required to qualify for an easement).  Results from the Weibull 




Table 4a reports the mean durations for parcels by easement qualification status, using 
model results corresponding to Table 2, while Table 4b reports the mean durations using the 
expanded model results from Table 3.  In both cases, the predicted mean durations are 
significantly longer for parcels with an easement option. These mean durations range from about 
13 to 18 years (depending on parcel size) for easement-eligible parcels, as contrasted with mean 
durations of 10 to 15 years for parcels that do not have the easement option.
16  These results 
suggest that the mere existence of the preservation option extends the time until conversion by 




This study empirically estimates several predictions of real options theory in a land use context, 
including whether price uncertainty impacts decisions to convert farmland to developed uses and 
whether the presence of multiple land use options – specifically, an option to preserve farmland 
in a PDR program – delays development decisions.  In doing so we use a duration modeling 
approach, which captures the conditional dependence of the conversion decision:  it explicitly 
recognizes that the probability that a given parcel will begin the development conversion process 
in the next period is conditional on the fact it did not convert in any previous period. We find 
significant evidence that the option to sell a PDR easement decreases the rate of development 
and does so by approximately 40%.  This estimate was robust across different model 
                                                 
15 The AIC criteria is used for comparing non-nested models, and compares the likelihood values because the same 
number of parameters are estimated by both models:  2(log likelihood) 2( 1) AIC c p = −+ + + ,  
where c is the number of covariates and p the number of ancillary parameters. 
 
  20specifications.  These findings are in line with real options theory predictions, which imply that 
the addition of an option to the choice set will increase the value of waiting to the landowner.   
 
An additional element of real options theory suggests that price uncertainty, measured by 
the variance and drift in development returns, affects the speed of development.   We found little 
support for the contention that drift in returns matters even after adapting the model by allowing 
different coefficients for parcels with different development capacity.  However at least two 
data-related reasons may account for the non-result.  First, the concept of drift makes sense in 
terms of the theoretical literature on real options, but is difficult to operationalize using real data.  
Our measure is at best a proxy for the concept and suffers from measurement error from a 
number of sources.  Second, it may be difficult to separate the effects of drift from other time 
varying explanatory variables such as interest rates, construction cost indices, etc.   
 
With regard to variance in returns, however, we uncovered some interesting results.  
Increases in variance appeared to affect parcels differently depending on the parcel’s 
development capacity.  An increase in variance was found to significantly delay conversion 
decisions for parcels with lower lot capacity, but tended to speed up conversion for parcels with 
the highest lot capacities.   
 
We also investigated how long landowners delay conversion decisions, given the 
existence of an easement option.  The existence of an easement option extends the mean duration 
(delayed the conversion decision) between 2.5 to 3 years, delaying the approximately 15 year 
average conversion time by 15-25 percent.  Given that the induced delay is only a few years, the 
amenity benefits generated by retaining land in a farming use (which ultimately develops) are 
probably limited.  However, if the delay in percentage terms is found to be consistent across 
regions, the gains from such programs could be considerably higher in areas where the general 
speed of conversion is happening at even a slightly slower rate. 
 
Whether PDR programs in other areas do cause a similar delay will likely depend on how 
similar important program features are to Howard County’s program.  One important feature is 
                                                                                                                                                             
16 These numbers are in line with the county planners’ expectations of when the county will be fully developed. 
  21how much the PDR program pays a landowner for an easement, relative to what the easement is 
worth.  Howard County has used a static formula to determining the easement price.  This design 
feature may make Howard County’s program a less attractive alternative to development than 
programs whose payment mechanisms more closely follow stochastic land prices.  Theory 
predicts the closer are the values of multiple options and the more correlated their returns, the 
greater the delay in choosing between options (Gelter and Riddiough).  Transaction costs 
associated with the preservation option may also matter.  For example, Howard County’s PDR 
program has not required landowners to enroll in ‘agricultural districts’ as a prerequisite to 
selling an easement.  District agreements often entail forgoing both development and 
preservation options for an initial period of several years, while maintaining active farming 
enterprises. This district requirement can be costly in rapidly developing areas, increasing the 
wedge between preservation and development option values (i.e., these costs could reduce the 
value of the preservation option).  They may therefore make it easier for landowners to decide 
between the two options – potentially leading to quite insignificant delaying effects of PDR 
programs on conversion rates.
17  
 
This research provides empirical evidence of a previously untested prediction of real 
options theory:  that additional options increase the value of waiting to make irreversible 
decisions.  However, as we found the delay to average only 3 to 5 years, PDR programs may 
provide only limited additional open space and amenity benefits beyond what is provided on 
preserved parcels. 
                                                 
17 Delaying development is a program goal for many agricultural district programs; however, these programs may 
not delay development at all, if their only participants are those landowners who plan to preserve their land. 
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Table 1.  Summary Statistics 
Variable Description  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
Options Variables 
Drift  Drift in unimproved lot price  2.996192 7.490031 -23.0759 30.14963
Stderr  Standard error of unimproved lot price  24.84786  13.30525  0.05753  60.00807
Easement  Qualified for easement  0.147667  0.354779  0  1
  
Returns to Development 
distba  Distance to Baltimore, MD  7.096908  2.666106  0.034306  18.04557
distdc  Distance to Washington, DC  11.85901  2.300788  0.034306  16.99626
devRate 
Development rate in census tract of parcels 
not developed to full potential  5.193862  6.890726  0  62.09935
s_comm  % surrounding land use in  commercial  8.99245 10.83037  0 63.90587
s_open  % surr land use in preserved or protect  22.12232  15.00339  0  87.96947
s_undev 
% surrounding land use in undeveloped 
land without a house  10.93621 8.032735  0 56.70102
s_subdiv 
% surrounding land use in vacant 
subdivided land  4.34235 4.524894 0  44.3803
s_residential  % surrounding land use in  residential  24.19855 13.17926 0.030071 72.94289
sewerPlnd  Sewer  planned  0.134425  0.341117 0 1
Popden Population  density 0.121946  0.15734 0  0.999747
Intrate Interest  rate  4.568636  0.893655  2.9975  5.82
  
Construction Costs 
cci  Construction costs index (Baltimore  area)  2908.822  201.5257 2508.06 3099.25
steep  % own parcel with steep slopes  0.1554 0.302294 0 1
forest  % own parcel in forest cover  35.90895 36.0916 0  100
notRoadSuit  % own parcel not road suitable  38.41441  27.59166  0  100
notSepticSuit  % own parcel not septic suitable  17.44426  28.26425  0  100
  
Regulations and Zoning 
noApfo 
No adequate public facilities moratorium 
(=1 if none, 0 otherwise)  0.912672  0.282323 0 1
reqOpenSpace 
Open space required (=1 if yes, 0 
otherwise)  0.760141  0.427009 0 1
numlots 
Full development potential in number of 
lots  20.97211 43.91253  3 859.1024
  
Returns to Agricultural Use 
farmed   0.195067  0.396263 0 1
class1  % own land use class 1 soils (prime)  1.293702  5.174995  0  66.97584
class2  % own land use class 2 soils  42.23682  30.40452  0  100.0492
class3  % own land use class 3 soils  27.11175  23.36565  0  100.0015
class4  % own land use class 4 soils  9.018492  16.65641  0  99.98521
acres  Parcel size, in acres  27.53602 56.41598 0.779649 1419.976
acres2  Parcel size, squared 3940.824  51567.19 0.607852  2016331
N=1688 
  25Sources:  Maryland Department of Planning; Maryland Department of Assessments and Taxation; Maryland 
Department of Natural Resources; Maryland State Highway Administration; Howard County Department of 
Planning; U.S. Census Bureau.
  26Table 2.  Hazard Model Estimates 
   Weibull   Gompertz  PW Exponential  Cox Exact 
 Log(L)=-951.90  Log(L)=-1021.01  Log(L)=-1035.21  Log(L)=-1536.67 
Variable  Ratio  P>|z|  Ratio  P>|z|  Ratio  P>|z| Ratio P>|z| 
Options Variables 
Drift +1.011138  0.075  *0.976758  0 0.993593 0.431  0.992888 0.451 
Stderr 1.000278  0.958  1.004172  0.433 0.995295  0.357  0.996356  0.5 
Easement *0.611996  0.038  *0.601389  0.031 *0.577294 0.019 *0.569602 0.017 
 
Development Pressure 
distBA 0.981605  0.508  0.979639  0.459 0.973441  0.323  0.976394  0.41 
distDC *0.923201  0.002  *0.938889  0.012 *0.937283 0.008 *0.937612 0.017 
devRate *1.043397  0  *1.04578 0 *1.033323 0 *1.037677 0 
s_comm  *1.018534  0.012  *1.017793 0.016 *1.017787 0.016  *1.01804 0.014 
s_open *1.021331  0  *1.020681  0 *1.020405 0  *1.021541 0 
s_undev  *1.015865  0.052  +1.014775 0.066 1.011074 0.174  1.010858 0.223 
s_subdiv *1.039921  0.001  *1.038764  0.001 *1.033243 0.006 *1.034506 0.012 
s_residential *1.026092  0  *1.026385 0 *1.026266 0 *1.027133 0 
sewerPlnd *0.343196  0  *0.347444 0 *0.307815 0 *0.267255 0 
Popden  1.10763  0.769 1.108759 0.771 1.012444 0.973  0.966654 0.929 
Intrate 0.927379  0.181  *0.905878  0.048 *0.835562  0.023  0.897022  (1) 
             
Construction costs 
cci *0.988907  0  *0.995254  0 0.999364  0.217  1.000446  (1) 
steep *0.994762  0.035  *0.994613  0.031 *0.994143 0.018  *0.993734  0.018 
forest *1.003434  0.025  *1.003263  0.033 *1.003106 0.039 *1.003306 0.04 
notRoadSuit *0.986519  0  *0.986559 0 *0.98663 0 *0.985895 0 
notSepticSuit 1.001902  0.505  1.001237  0.657 1.001707  0.536  1.002279  0.42 
 
Regulatory Variables 
noApfo  *1.991308  0.001  *1.646142 0.023 1.069712 0.753  1.08623 0.729 
reqOpenSpace  1.249602  0.199 1.241012 0.214 1.232845 0.222  1.277927 0.175 
numlots *1.005111  0  *1.005022 0 *1.005206 0 *1.007268 0 
 
Agriculture Returns 
farmed *0.117773  0  *0.114351 0 *0.121164 0 *0.109683 0 
class1  1.002731  0.813  1.00177 0.878 1.003915 0.721  1.003296 0.775 
class 2  1.001488  0.509  1.001465  0.508 1.002123  0.339  1.002355  0.3 
class  3  0.998974  0.69  0.99925 0.768 0.999575 0.867  0.999506 0.856 
class  4  1.003346  0.402 1.003759 0.339 1.004362 0.253  1.004325 0.316 
acres *1.025732  0  *1.026757  0 *1.027527 0  *1.026716 0 
acres2 *0.999916  0.001  *0.999913  0.001 *0.99991 0.001 *0.999914 0 
 p  3.79 
(0.2278) 
gamma 0.2844 
(0.042)       
* significant at the 5% level   
+ significant at 10% level   
N=1688 
Note: (1) these variables do not vary over time or observations, preventing estimation of standard errors in the Cox 
model. 
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Table 3.  Selected Estimates from Expanded Model (Options variables) 
 
Note: grp0 represents parcels in the bottom decile in the distribution of lot yields; grp9 are parcels in the top decile. 
  Weibull  Gompertz  PW Exponential  Cox  
  Log(L)=-913.66 Log(L)=-986.30  Log(L)=-1000.57  Log(L)=-1503.16 
Variable  Ratio P>|z|  Ratio P>|z| Ratio  P>|z|  Ratio P>|z| 
grp0_drift  1.023283    0.121 .9962025  0.825  1.013243 0.438  1.013596  0.590 
grp0_sterr  .9849205    0.121 .9890488  0.281  *.9804963 0.053  +.9811451  0.057 
grp1_drift  1.054959    0.108 1.035443  0.378  1.051528 0.168  1.053649  0.138 
grp1_sterr  *.9597926    0.001 *.9607075  0.003  *.9521624 0.000  *.9518493  0.001 
grp2_drift  .9528924    0.115 *.9251431  0.006  *.9462182 0.049  +.9448401  0.065 
grp2_sterr  *.9733181    0.025 *.9769598  0.055  *.9693769 0.010  *.9696668  0.005 
grp3_drift  1.007849    0.734 .9740243  0.312  1.002395 0.922  1.002875  0.933 
grp3_sterr  +.9802573    0.088 .9842052 0.183  *.9744947 0.033  *.9748558 0.021 
grp4_drift  1.015174    0.668 .9841218  0.685  .9987583 0.976  .9990128  0.977 
grp4_sterr  .9821466    0.113 .9850808  0.205  *.9754464 0.037  *.9757212  0.020 
grp5_drift  1.028864    0.344 .9960801  0.910  1.015173 0.657  1.016028  0.574 
grp5_sterr  .9862668    0.153 .9896249  0.316  *.9799292 0.048  *.9803917  0.044 
grp6_drift  .9848963    0.573 +.9513613  0.056   .967463 0.213  .9636158  0.142 
grp6_sterr  1.001927    0.807 1.006004  0.461  .9974968 0.757  .9990588  0.905 
grp7_drift  1.004634    0.749  *.969213  0.046  .9882314 0.475  .9875761  0.559 
grp7_sterr  1.005223    0.473 1.008854  0.236  .9994515 0.941   1.00077  0.918 
grp8_drift  1.019437    0.172  .981994  0.191  .9998825 0.994  .9997816  0.991 
grp8_sterr  *1.015463    0.031 *1.018793  0.009  1.009388 0.169  1.011247  0.144 
grp9_drift  1.013282    0.119 *.9691176  0.002  .9856585 0.192  .9821995  0.303 
grp9_sterr  *1.039549    0.000 *1.040353  0.000  *1.032123 0.000  *1.035702  0.000 
Easementi  +.6364394    0.089 +.6419434  0.088  +.6274188 0.069  .6114643*  0.047 
* significant at 5% level 
+ significant at 10% level 
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Table 4a. Predicted Mean Durations by Parcel Size 
  Qualified for Easement  





































Table 4b. Predicted Mean Durations (expanded model) by 
Parcel Size 
  Qualified for Easement  
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Source: Interpretation of Maryland Department of Assessments and Taxation.
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Appendix 1.  Descriptive Statistics, by deciles of distribution of number of lots 
Category 
(percentile) Variable  Mean  StdDev  Min  Max 
0 (lowest  decile )  Number Lots  3.298328  0.977534 0.127396 4.506446 
 Acres  7.702142  6.626167 0.848223 29.11016 
1 Number  Lots  5.027978 0.211871 4.511644 5.366228 
  Acres  11.8614 10.13895 0.779649 50.35798 
2 Number  Lots  5.774608 0.231991 5.380042 6.147574 
 Acres  13.10127  10.73475 0.958372 49.56123 
3 Number  Lots  6.521487 0.22899 6.154715 7.017229 
  Acres  10.6197 11.21607 1.040862 50.81467 
4 Number  Lots  7.786827 0.493632 7.01906  8.744633 
 Acres  12.14738  15.25849 1.358659 71.92941 
5 Number  Lots  9.854905 0.712517 8.747434 11.08855 
 Acres  17.86175  19.70958 1.46778  69.59932 
6 Number  Lots  12.69347 1.025953 11.11068 14.51694 
 Acres  24.51854  25.63246 1.889206 103.1477 
7 Number  Lots  17.41767 2.181683 14.5567  22.00215 
 Acres  34.50632  35.50078 2.911083 131.9972 
8 Number  Lots  30.17337 5.863926 22.10401 42.43069 
 Acres  67.39617  65.81826 3.771606 198.4414 
9 (highest decile)  Number Lots  111.0021  98.23418 42.59061 859.1024 
  Acres  75.4709 138.3518 7.267687 1419.976 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 